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Abstract
In 2004, Ba An Nguyen [Phys. Lett. A 328, 6-10] has presented a Quantum Dialogue scheme
for simultaneously communicating their messages. In this comment, we show that the quantum
dialogue scheme is not secure against the intercept-and-resend attack and we propose a modified
scheme which is secure against that attack.
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In 2004, Ba An Nguyen has presented the Quantum Dialogue scheme[1]. He demonstrated
that the protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance attack, the intercept-and-
resend attack and the entangle-and-measure attack.
Let us start with the brief description of the quantum dialogue protocol. Bob initially
prepares the state |ψ0.0〉hn,tn =
1√
2
[|01〉+ |10〉] and encodes his bits (kn, ln) by performing
Ukn,ln(U00 = I, U01 = σx, U10 = iσy and U11 = σz) on the state |ψ0.0〉hn,tn . Bob keeps qubit
hn with him and sends qubit tn to Alice. Alice confirms Bob that she received qubit. She
determines the mode(the message mode(MM) or the checking mode(CM)) and encodes her
messages by performing the unitary operation Uin,jn. If the mode is the checking mode,
she encodes random bits. And she sends Bob the encoded qubit tn. Bob performs a Bell
measurement on the pair of qubits with the result in state |ψxn,yn〉hn,tn , and listens to Alice
to tell him that was a run in MM or in CM. If it was a MM, Bob publicly reveals the values
of (xn, yn). Alice and Bob decodes the each other’s secret messages. That is, Alice’s bits
as in = |xn − kn| and jn = |yn − ln| and Bob’s bits as kn = |xn − in| and ln = |yn − jn|.
If it was a CM mode, Alice publicly announces the value of (in − jn). And Bob checks
the eavesdropping by checking both in = |xn − kn| and jn = |yn − ln|. If the checking
computation is correct, we determine that there is no eavesdropping. Otherwise the process
is discontinued.
The author claim that this protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance
attack, the intercept-and-resend attack and the entangle-and-measure attack. But our simple
strategy of attack shows that the protocol is not secure against the intercept-and-resend
attack. So that, undetectable eavesdropping scheme may exist. The method of attack is as
follows.
1. Bob prepares initial states and encodes his messages on the initial states. We suppose
that Bob’s encoded states is |ψk,l〉. Here (k, l) means a Bob’s secret messages. He
stores the first photon(home photon) h, and sends the second photon(travel photon)
t to Alice.
2. Eve intercepts the travel photon t and restores it. She generates any Bell states |ψk′,l′〉
and sends the second photon t′ of the states to Alice.
3. After receiving the travel photon t′ Alice randomly switches between MM and CM.
In the MM, Alice encodes her messages by performing the Pauli-operation on that
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FIG. 1: The intercept-and-resend attack to the quantum dialogue protocol. Here BSM means a
Bell states measurement.
photon. In the CM, Alice randomly encodes on that photon by using the same way.
Then Alice sends the photon to Bob.
4. Eve takes snatch the photon t′ and performs a Bell measurement on the pair of the
received photon t′ and the his first photon h′. Then he knows the Alice’s encoding
operations because she already knows Bob’s t′ and initial states of the pairs of photon
h′. So, Eve successfully eavesdrops the Alice’s secret messages. And Eve performs the
same operation with Alice did on the photon t. Eve sends the encoded photon t to
Bob.
5. Bob receives the travel photon t and performs a Bell measurement on both photon h
and t to decode Alice’s information. And Bob wait for Alice to tell him that was a
perform in MM or in CM. If it was a MM, Bob decodes the Alice’s messages by using
the initial states, his encoding operation and final Bell measurement outcome. And he
publicly announce the his measurement outcome to allow Alice also to decode Bob’s
message. If it was a CM, Alice publicly announces the her operator for Bob to check
the Eve.
In this checking step, Eve’s intervention is not reveled. Because Eve knows Alice’s
messages and performs the encoding operations according the messages.
Eve has no access to Bob’s home photon h but can handle the travel photon t while it
goes from Bob to Alice and travel photon t′ when from Alice to Bob. Our attacking strategy
is not detected by permitted users. Eve eavesdrops the Alice’s all secret messages without
detection. But he doesn’t know Bob’s messages. Note that the attacker is not revealed to
the right users and the messages of the one of users is exposed to the attacker in the attack.
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Let us now consider how to modify the Quantum Dialogue protocol to make it secure
against the proposed attack. Bob initially prepares the state |ψ0.0〉hn,tn =
1√
2
[|01〉+ |10〉] and
chooses the mode of two mode, MM and CM. For the MM, he encodes his secret messages
(kn, ln) by performing Ukn,ln on the state |ψ0.0〉hn,tn . For the CM, he encodes just random bits.
Then he sends the second photon tn to Alice. Alice’s choice of the mode is the same with
the Bob’s action. Alice sends the photon tn back to Bob. Bob performs a Bell measurement
on the pairs of the photon hn and tn. Alice and Bob publicly announce the mode which they
chose. If Alice’s and Bob’s choice was CM at the same time, they inform their encoding
operation and Bob announce his measurement outcome. Then they can determine the Eve’s
intervention by checking the correlation of states. If Alice’s and Bob’s mode choice was
different, they do not inform their encoding operations. In this case, only one user can know
opposite user’s messages. That is, If Alice chose CM and Bob chose MM, Alice can know
Bob’s message by using her operation and measurement outcome. If Alice chose MM and
Bob chose CM, Bob can know Alice’s message by using Alice’s measurement outcome and
his operation. If Alice’s and Bob’s mode was MM at the same time, the decoding method is
the same as the original quantum dialogue protocol. The point of security of this protocol
is that each of two communicators have a choice of the mode. The checking mode is runs if
and only if they chose CM simultaneously. If they selected different mode each other, the
protocol runs in one-way communication.
In summary, we show that the quantum dialogue protocol proposed by Nguyen[1] is not
secure against the intercept-and-resend attack and propose a modified quantum dialogue
protocol which is secure against the attack described above. The modified quantum dialogue
protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance attack, the entangle-and-measure
attack and the intercept-and-resend attack. Its proofs about asymptotic security is the same
as that of the original quantum dialogue protocol.
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